Peter Singer Quote

Sidgwick thinks these judgments give rise to a dictate of reason, by which he means that if we were purely rational beings, it would motivate us to action. Human beings are not purely rational beings, so although accepting the dictate of reason will give us a motive to act in the way the maxim of benevolence prescribes, we are likely to have other motives, some of which will support it and some that may conflict with it. Among the supporting motives will be what Sidgwick called sympathy and philanthropic enthusiasm, by which he may mean something akin to what today would be called empathy. Among the opposing motives may be racism, nationalism, and egoism. But in a person who sees that it is more rational to aim at the good of all than the good of some smaller group, following one’s own interest and disregarding the interests of others is likely to seem ignoble. That will produce a sense of discomfort that Sidgwick calls the normal emotional concomitant or expression of the recognition that the good of the whole—that is, of everyone—is to be preferred to the good of the part, that is, oneself.

Peter Singer

Sidgwick thinks these judgments give rise to a dictate of reason, by which he means that if we were purely rational beings, it would motivate us to action. Human beings are not purely rational beings, so although accepting the dictate of reason will give us a motive to act in the way the maxim of benevolence prescribes, we are likely to have other motives, some of which will support it and some that may conflict with it. Among the supporting motives will be what Sidgwick called sympathy and philanthropic enthusiasm, by which he may mean something akin to what today would be called empathy. Among the opposing motives may be racism, nationalism, and egoism. But in a person who sees that it is more rational to aim at the good of all than the good of some smaller group, following one’s own interest and disregarding the interests of others is likely to seem ignoble. That will produce a sense of discomfort that Sidgwick calls the normal emotional concomitant or expression of the recognition that the good of the whole—that is, of everyone—is to be preferred to the good of the part, that is, oneself.

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About Peter Singer

Peter Albert David Singer (born 6 July 1946) is an Australian moral philosopher who is Emeritus Ira W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics at Princeton University. Singer's work specialises in applied ethics, approaching the subject from a secular, utilitarian perspective. He wrote the book Animal Liberation (1975), in which he argues for vegetarianism, and the essay "Famine, Affluence, and Morality", which argues the moral imperative of donating to help the poor around the world. For most of his career, he was a preference utilitarian. He revealed in The Point of View of the Universe (2014), coauthored with Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek, that he had become a hedonistic utilitarian.
On two occasions, Singer served as chair of the philosophy department at Monash University, where he founded its Centre for Human Bioethics. In 1996, he stood unsuccessfully as a Greens candidate for the Australian Senate. In 2004, Singer was recognised as the Australian Humanist of the Year by the Council of Australian Humanist Societies. In 2005, The Sydney Morning Herald placed him among Australia's ten most influential public intellectuals. Singer is a cofounder of Animals Australia and the founder of the non-profit organization The Life You Can Save.